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The Impact of RFRA on Employment Discrimination: Will the Hobby Lobby Decision Erode 
the Purpose of Title VII? 
Introduction: 
 Throughout our nation’s history, many Supreme Court decisions have affected the 
employer-employee relationship. A recent example was Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.,1 a 
decision which arguably protected the free exercise rights of a private corporation above the 
interests of its workers. The Court did so by allowing closely-held, private corporations to invoke 
protections provided by the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”)2 like a private 
individual could. Although corporate personhood is not a new concept, this was the first time 
that the Supreme Court allowed Free Exercise Claims to be asserted by a company that is not 
religious in nature or mission. Generally, a claim that a neutral law of general applicability 
interferes with a plaintiff’s free exercise of religion is a Constitutional Claim.3 In 1990, the 
Supreme Court, in Employment Division, Dept. of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, cut off 
the availability of these types of claims by holding that neutral laws of general applicability 
could not interfere with the First Amendment’s free exercise protections.4 Congress reacted by 
enacting RFRA. The intent of RFRA was to restore the pre-Smith compelling interest test.5 
However, interpretation of RFRA by the Supreme Court has shown that instead, RFRA 
expanded available protections for business. The prediction by the Court in Smith,6 that a strict 
compelling interest test would undermine many of our nations laws, has begun to come true. Not 
                                                 
1 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). 
2 The Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. §2000bb et seq. 
3 See, e.g. United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 254 (1982); Employment Division, Dept. of Human Resources of 
Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
4 Id. at 878; see also 137 CONG. REC. E3083-02 (September 18, 1991) (statement of Hon. Glenn M. Anderson of 
California) (“Justice Scalia is content to ignore the constitutional rights of two men because of the precedent he fears 
it might set for mass exceptions to other generally applicable laws.”). 
5 137 CONG. REC. E2422-01 (June 27, 1991) (statement of Hon. Stephen J. Solarz of New York). 
6 494 U.S. at 888 (“many laws would not meet the [compelling interest] test. Any society adopting such a system 
would be courting anarchy . . . We cannot afford the luxury of deeming presumptively invalid, as applied to the 
religious objector, every regulation of conduct that does not protect an interest of the highest order.”). 
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surprisingly, the dissent in Hobby Lobby also predicted the coming of many RFRA claims by 
both religious and private employers, specifically warning of potential interference with long-
held protections for employees under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”) and 
the Fair Labor Standards Act.7 Though the majority states that the holding will not extend so far,8 
some closely held corporations have already begun to use this holding to assert a RFRA defense 
to Title VII discrimination claims.9 Our current Congress is probably unlikely to amend RFRA 
again to curtail its expansion. Unless a limitation on these types of claims is adopted by the 
Supreme Court, RFRA and Hobby Lobby could severely undermine protections against 
discrimination in the workplace. 
 Part I of this paper will analyze the history and development of free exercise claims 
against facially neutral laws in the employment context, including the passage of RFRA and its 
applications. Part II will discuss the purpose of Title VII and how it relates to the government’s 
compelling interest when challenged by free exercise claims. It will further examine religious 
protections for both employers and employees which are already in place under Anti-
discrimination statutes and the common law ministerial exception. Part III discusses whether 
RFRA should be available as a defense against discrimination claims for closely-held, for-profit 
corporations. Finally, Part IV concludes that if the RFRA defense is available, the existing 
framework for analyzing religious defenses, the ministerial exception, should become the model 
                                                 
7 134 S.Ct. at 2802 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“Suppose an employer’s sincerely held religious belief is offended 
by . . . paying the minimum wage.”). 
8 Id. at 2783 (“The principal dissent raises the possibility that discrimination in hiring, for example on the basis of 
race, might be cloaked as religious practice to escape legal sanction. . . . Our decision today provides no such 
shield.”). 
9 E.E.O.C. v. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., 201 F.Supp.3d 837 (E.D. Mich 2016) (granting summary 
judgment on Employee’s Title VII sex discrimination claim to funeral home employer where the “religious” owner 
successfully asserted a RFRA defense), reversed and remanded, 884 F.3d 560, 567 (6th Cir. March 7, 2018). 
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for determining whether a neutral law substantially burdens the “religion” of a closely-held, for-
profit employer.   
I. Free Exercise Jurisprudence, From Sherbert to Hobby Lobby and Beyond 
A. The Development of the Compelling Interest Test 
 The First Amendment prevents the government from making laws which expressly 
interfere with a person’s free exercise of religion.10 As a result, it is hard to find a law which, on 
its face, prefers or burdens a religious practice. However, there are many facially neutral laws 
which could, when applied or enforced, burden a person’s free exercise of religion. Our 
jurisprudence is full of these types of claims.11 To make such a claim, a person must show that 
application and enforcement of a law to that person would violate their sincerely held religious 
beliefs.12 An early case, which set forth the standard for finding a free exercise violation, was 
Sherbert v. Verner.13  
 In Sherbert, the plaintiff, a Seventh Day Adventist who was prohibited by her sincerely 
held religious beliefs from working on Saturdays, challenged the denial of her unemployment 
compensation claim under South Carolina law.14 Her employer scheduled her to work Saturdays, 
                                                 
10 U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the 
free exercise thereof.”). 
11 See, e.g. United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982) (requirement to pay social security tax violates sincerely held 
beliefs of the Amish); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (compulsory school attendance violates sincerely 
held religious beliefs of the Amish); Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Com., 480 U.S. 136 (1987) (denying a 
seventh day Adventist unemployment because she would not work on Saturday was a violation of the First 
Amendment). 
12 See Gonzales v. O Centro Espirito Beneficiente Uniao de Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 428 (2006) (a "prima facie case 
under RFRA . . . [shows that] application of [a neutral law] would (1) substantially burden (2) a sincere (3) religious 
exercise."). 
13 374 U.S. 398 (1963). Note that prior to Sherbert, claims of interference with a plaintiff’s free exercise of religion 
were found to be without merit. See, e.g. Gallager v. Crown Kosher Super Market, Inc., 366 U.S. 617 (1961) 
(holding that Massachusetts’s Sunday closing laws were not an impermissible burden on Orthodox Jewish plaintiff’s 
religious beliefs which prevented him from doing business on Saturdays because the Sunday closing law did not 
have religious purpose). 
14 374 U.S. at 399-401. 
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forcing her to quit, and she refused to take other employment that required Saturday work.15 This 
refusal to take available employment led to the denial of her unemployment benefits.16 The 
plaintiff claimed that this denial was an impermissible burden on her free exercise of religion, 
and the Supreme Court agreed.17 The Supreme Court reversed the South Carolina Supreme 
Court’s holding that because the law did not expressly burden religion on its face, she could not 
make out a valid claim.18 For the first time, Justice Brennan articulated what became known as 
the compelling interest test: if a plaintiff can make out a prima facie case that a facially neutral 
and generally applicable law substantially burdens her free exercise of religion, the law cannot 
be applied to that plaintiff unless the government can show that it (1) had a compelling interest in 
applying the law and (2) enforcing the law against this plaintiff was the least restrictive means of 
accomplishing its compelling interest.19 The South Carolina government failed to meet this high 
burden, resulting in a finding that the denial of unemployment was unconstitutional as applied to 
the plaintiff.20   
 Over the next twenty-seven years, the Court applied the Sherbert compelling interest test 
to a handful of other cases, most often finding for the government.21 Most notable was the 
Court’s consideration of compulsory Social Security Tax payments as applied to an Amish 
employer.22 The Court agreed with the plaintiff’s argument that since his Amish religion required 
                                                 
15 Id. 
16 Id. 
17 Id. at 404 (“The ruling forces her to choose between following the precepts of her religion and forfeiting benefits, 
on the one hand, and abandoning one of the precepts of her religion in order to accept work, on the other hand. 
Governmental imposition of such a choice puts the same kind of burden upon the free exercise of religion as would 
a fine imposed against appellant for her Saturday worship.”). 
18 Id. at 401-02. 
19 Id. at 406-07. 
20 Id. 
21 See James E. Ryan, Smith and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act: an Iconoclastic Assessment, 78 VA. L. 
REV. 1407, 1412-16 (1992). 
22 United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982). 
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him to take care of the elderly as part of a religiously-defined social welfare system, paying 
money into a social security system he would not use was a substantial burden on his sincerely-
held religious belief.23 This was sufficient to meet the first prong of the compelling interest test. 
Nevertheless, the Court found the Government’s compelling interest in preserving the Social 
Security System outweighed the burden to the plaintiff, holding that “not all burdens on religion 
are unconstitutional.”24 The Court commented that when a religious person chooses to operate a 
business with a non-religious purpose and avail himself of the benefits therefrom, he inevitably 
sacrifices some of his free exercise rights.25 Justice Stevens’s concurrence went further, 
suggesting that if a person wants to challenge the government’s interference with his free 
exercise of religion based on the application of a law of general applicability, the burden should 
be on the challenger, not the government, to prove there is a “unique reason for allowing him a 
special exemption.”26 In the years after Sherbert, the Court did not often hold in favor of 
religious challengers to neutral laws.   
B. The End of the Compelling Interest Test: Employment Division v. Smith 
 In 1990, with another challenge to the loss of unemployment benefits, the Court did away 
with the compelling interest test, holding that incidental effects of neutral laws on free exercise 
do not raise first amendment concerns.27 In Smith, the plaintiffs challenged the State’s denial of 
their unemployment benefits after they were fired for the “misconduct” of smoking peyote, a 
Schedule I narcotic, outside of work hours.28 The plaintiffs engaged in this act, illegal under 
Oregon law, as part of a religious observance.29 Justice O’Connor’s concurrence points out that 
                                                 
23 Id. at 254. 
24 Id. at 257.   
25 Id. at 261.   
26 Id. at 262. Subsequent jurisprudence has not gone in this direction. 
27 Employment Division, Dept. of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878 (1990). 




forcing the plaintiffs to choose to observe their religion or violate the law could easily be 
interpreted as a substantial burden to the plaintiffs’ free exercise rights.30 However, the majority 
declined to follow, and essentially overruled, the compelling interest test, holding that neutral 
laws of general applicability should no longer be held to interfere with free exercise rights.31 
 It is a permissible reading of the text . . . to say that if prohibiting the exercise of religion 
 . . . is not the object of the tax but merely the incidental effect of a generally applicable 
 and otherwise valid provision, the First Amendment has not been offended. . . . [W]e 
 have never held that an individual's religious beliefs excuse him from compliance with an 
 otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct that the state is free to regulate. . . . 32 
The Court did not agree with the plaintiffs’ broad interpretation of the free exercise clause, 
saying that “Respondents urge us to hold . . . when otherwise prohibitable conduct is 
accompanied by religious convictions, . . . it must be free from governmental regulation. We 
have never held that, and decline to do so now.”33 This holding reflected the Court’s worry that 
such a strict burden on the government to defend free exercise claims against neutral laws would 
lead to anarchy.34 However, in the years that followed, with Congress’ subsequent direction in 
the form of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”), the Court has reversed course, 
broadening both the available challenges to free exercise burdens and the class of people that can 
invoke a free exercise defense. 
C. The Enactment of RFRA 
 RFRA was first introduced on July 26, 1990.35 A year later, Representative Stephen J. 
Solarz reintroduced the bill, clearly stating Congress’ distaste for the Court’s decision in Smith. 
                                                 
30 Id. at 904 (O’Connor, J., concurring).  
31 Id. at 878. 
32 Id. at 878-79. 
33 Id. at 882. 
34 Id. at 888. (“The rule respondents favor would open the prospect of constitutionally required religious exemptions 
from civic obligations of almost every conceivable kind.”). 
35 Ryan, supra note 21, at 1436 and nn. 164-66. 
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This legislation has the narrow purpose of restoring the compelling interest test . . . . The 
test strikes an appropriate balance between the needs of the majority and the rights of 
religious minorities. It would provide a claim or defense to persons whose religious 
exercise is burdened by Government.36 
The current form of RFRA was introduced in both the house and the senate on March 11, 1993.37 
The bill was overwhelmingly supported in both houses, and was signed into law on November 
16, 1993.38 RFRA restores the compelling interest test, allowing claims of interference with free 
exercise of religion to be a defense to the enforcement of any law, even one of general 
applicability.39 A RFRA defense is a statutory claim, often made in addition to a constitutional 
claim. The relevant text of RFRA is as follows: 
 (a) IN GENERAL.—Government shall not substantially burden a person’s 
exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, 
except as provided in subsection (b). 
(b) EXCEPTION.—Government may substantially burden a person’s exercise of 
religion only if it demonstrates that application of the burden to the person— 
(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and 
(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental 
interest.40 
It is clear from the legislative history that Congress intended to restore the compelling interest 
and nothing more.41 However, in the years since RFRA’s passage, it has been used expansively 
by individuals, not-for-profit religious organizations, and even private corporations to claim 
exemptions from neutral laws of general application, expanding its reach beyond giving 
guidance to the Court. The only curtailment of RFRA has been that it has been declared 
unconstitutional as applied to State law.42 The states have had very different reactions to this; 
                                                 
36 137 CONG. REC. E2422-01 (June 27, 1991) (statement of Hon. Stephen J. Solarz of New York). 
37 H.R. 1308 — 103rd Congress: Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, GOVTRACK.US, 
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/103/hr1308. 
38 Id. 
39 Pub. L. 103-141 (1993), codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1. 
40 Id.  
41 Ryan, supra note 21 at 1410 n. 17, 1437 n. 166.  
42 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 511(1997). 
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California applies the rational basis test to free exercise challenges,43 while Indiana enacted its 
own RFRA which was intended to be even broader than the federal statute.44 It remains to be 
seen how far the Court will go in protecting free exercise claims against neutral laws since the 
passage of RFRA, however, it is clear that it has only been expanding since Smith.    
 RFRA is intended to be used as a defense to government action.45 Since its passage, the 
Supreme Court has considered several claims which raise a RFRA defense against the 
government.46 One important such case was Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do 
Vegetal.47 This case has facts very similar to the claims rejected in Smith, making it a good 
illustration of how the Court changed course after RFRA. Members of a small religious group, 
the UDV church, challenged the government’s prohibition of their use of hoasca, a sacred 
mixture which contained DMT, a Schedule I hallucinogen prohibited by the Controlled 
Substances Act (“CSA”).48 The Court held that the church, by showing that “application of [a 
neutral law] would (1) substantially burden (2) a sincere (3) religious exercise," had made out a 
prima facie case for a RFRA defense to enforcement of the CSA against them.49 The Court 
remanded the case for consideration of a RFRA defense, saying that the Government now had 
the ultimate burden of proof on the CSA’s constitutionality as applied to the church.50 
Interestingly, the Court spent a lot of time discussing the current exceptions in the CSA for other 
                                                 
43 Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Superior Court, 32 Cal 4th 527, 566-67 (2004). 
44 Tyms-Bey v. State, 2017 Ind. App. LEXIS 11, *9-*12 (January 13, 2017). 
45 42 U.S.C. §2000bb-1(a) (1993). 
46 See, e.g. City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S.Ct. 2157 (1997) (RFRA is unconstitutional as applied to the states); 
Hobby Lobby, 134 S.Ct. 2751 (2014) discussed infra, Section I.E.; Wheaton College v. Burwell, 134 S.Ct. 2806 
(2014) (holding that the reporting requirement for opting out of the contraceptive mandate of the ACA may also 
violate RFRA); Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S.Ct. 853 (2015) (grooming policies for prisons which did not allow religiously 
mandated beards violated RFRA); Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 
(2006) (holding, in a case almost on all fours with Smith, that preventing the use of hoasca, a sacred drink 
containing a Schedule I narcotic, made out a prima facie violation of RFRA.). 
47 Id. 
48 Id. at 425. 
49 Id. at 428. 
50 Id. at 429. 
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Native American religious rituals which use Schedule I drugs.51 Because that exception already 
existed, it likely was difficult for the Court to honestly hold that there was no less restrictive 
means of burdening the UDV church’s free exercise of religion. 
D. Where the Government is Not a Party, Circuits Disagree as to Whether RFRA is 
Available as a Defense. 
 The Court’s holdings since the passage of RFRA clearly outline a path to relief against 
government interference with free exercise. RFRA and the Gonzales decision lay out, in more or 
less simple terms, the steps for a prima facie case and the high standards the government must 
meet in order to satisfy the compelling interest test and burden a person’s free exercise of 
religion. Nevertheless, there have been several attempts to expand the application of RFRA, 
including attempting a RFRA defense against a private party instead of the government. The 
availability of this defense remains somewhat of an open question. 
 The Seventh Circuit has expressly determined that RFRA is not available as a defense in 
suits between private parties. In Listecki v. Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors, the 
Catholic Church of Milwaukee, facing bankruptcy, transferred $55 million into its cemetery 
perpetual care funds in order to avoid paying its creditors, victims of church sexual abuse.52 The 
creditors filed suit, claiming fraud under the bankruptcy code, and the church asserted defenses 
under both RFRA and the First Amendment.53 The court held that since the creditors’ committee 
was not acting “under color of law,” it was not the “government” for purposes of RFRA, and 
therefore invoking RFRA as a defense was improper.54 However, the court recognized that the 
                                                 
51 Id. at 432-33. 
52 780 F.3d 731, 734 (7th Cir. 2015). 
53 Id. 
54 Id. at p. 738 (no “close nexus” between the creditors’ committee and the government existed to invoke the State 
Action Doctrine), 741. 
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creditors’ challenge raised First Amendment implications as to the activities of the Church.55 
Since RFRA was unavailable, the court applied strict scrutiny to this constitutional claim, and 
found that (1) the burden to the church was outweighed by the compelling governmental interest 
of providing relief from bankruptcy to its citizens, and (2) it was narrowly tailored to achieve 
that interest.56 The court noted further that “The [Supreme] Court has rejected the idea that 
fraudulent or improper actions can be excused in the name of religion.”57 The Court used 
traditional constitutional analysis to find against the church, and also rejected the church’s 
attempt to use a RFRA defense against a private party. In the Seventh Circuit, RFRA is not 
available as a defense in suits between private parties. 
 The Second Circuit has other ideas about applying RFRA in suits between private parties. 
In Hankins v. Lyght, a minister challenged his church’s mandatory retirement age for ministers 
by filing an age discrimination suit under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act 
(“ADEA”).58 The district court dismissed, saying that the common law ministerial exception 
applied to bar the suit.59 On appeal, the Second Circuit held that “the RFRA must be deemed the 
full expression of Congress' intent with regard to the religion-related issues before us and 
displace earlier judge-made doctrines [the ministerial exception] that might have been used to 
amelieorate the ADEA’s impact on religious organizations and activities.”60 In other words, 
RFRA effectively amended the ADEA (and all statutes), and must be considered in religious 
                                                 
55 Id. at 741-42 (finding that making the $55 million available to the creditors could be a burden on the religious 
activity of caring for the dead). 
56 Id.; see also id. at 146 (like the importance of the availability of a strong social security system upheld against a 
religious challenge in U.S. v. Lee, discussed infra Part I.A., providing a safety net (the bankruptcy code) for citizens 
who experience financial trouble is a compelling government interest).   
57 Id. at 749. 
58 441 F.3d 96, 100 (2d Cir. 2006). 
59 Id.; see infra, Part II.B. for an explanation of the common law ministerial exception. 
60 Id. at 102. 
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challenges to neutral laws.61 Further, since the Equal Opportunity Employment Commission 
(“E.E.O.C.”) had the ability to file this lawsuit on behalf of the minister, that was sufficient 
governmental action to make RFRA available as a defense.62 The case was remanded for 
consideration of the RFRA defense.63 Because of this holding, parties with free exercise claims 
in the Second Circuit had to expressly waive their RFRA defense or it would be automatically 
considered by the court.64 RFRA is now available as a defense to suits between private parties in 
the Second Circuit.65   
 As of the writing of this paper, the Supreme Court has not considered this circuit split66 
on whether RFRA applies to suits between private parties.  Nevertheless, prior to invoking a 
RFRA defense in employment claims, a court should ask the natural threshold question: what is 
the nature of the employer/employee relationship? RFRA is intended to protect citizens against 
interference by the government in their free exercise of religion. A private party should not be 
excused from following the law in its interactions with other citizens, especially when it has 
power over those citizens as employees, just because of his or her religious beliefs. Part of living 
in a civilized society is sacrificing some personal autonomy for the greater good.67 Part of being 
                                                 
61 Id. at 104, 106. 
62 Id. at 103 (“the substance of the ADEA’s prohibitions cannot change depending on whether it is enforced by the 
EEOC or an aggrieved private party.”). 
63 Id. at 109. Note that the church did not plead the RFRA defense, it was imposed by the court. On remand, the 
court reached the same conclusion as it did the first time when applying the ministerial exception, and also held that 
the ministerial exception was still a valid consideration in these types of claims. Hankins v. New York Conf. of the 
United Methodist Church, 516 F.Supp.2d 225, 233, 236-38 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (further considering subsequent case 
law which distinguished claims under RFRA from the ministerial exception).  
64 See Rweyemanu v. Cote, 520 F.3d 198, 204-05 (2d Cir. 2008) (RFRA examines the burden on a sincerely held 
religious belief, while the ministerial exception prevents the government from impermissibly interfering with 
matters of church government and administration).   
65 See Redhead v. Conf. of Seventh Day Adventists, 440 F.Supp.2d 211, 219 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (the court does not 
want to consider RFRA as a defense between private parties but is bound by the decision in Hankins to do so).  
66 In addition to the cases considered in the Seventh and Second circuits, the defense is not available in a suit 
between private parties in the Third Circuit. See Mathis v. Christian Heating & Air Conditioning, Inc., 158 F.Supp. 
3d 317, 325-26 (E.D. Penn. 2016). 
67 See Lee, 455 U.S. at 261 (“When followers of a particular sect enter into commercial activity as a matter of 
choice, the limits they accept on their own conduct as a matter of conscience and faith are not to be superimposed on 
the statutory schemes which are binding on others in that activity.”); John Locke, A Letter About Toleration, Chapter 
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a business owner is sacrificing some property and liberty rights in order to take advantage of 
certain laws.68 
E. The Impact of Hobby Lobby on the RFRA Defense 
 In June of 2014, the Supreme Court decided Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.69 The 
Court was not considering the question of whether RFRA applied in suits between private 
parties, but rather the Court considered an expansion of RFRA which would prohibit the 
government from interfering with the sincerely held religious beliefs of a closely-held, for-profit 
corporation. Brought as a challenge to the requirement, in the Affordable Care Act, that 
employer-provided healthcare include contraceptive coverage (“the contraceptive mandate”), the 
issue in Hobby Lobby was if corporate personhood extended far enough that a corporation’s First 
Amendment free exercise right could be burdened.70 The claim was brought by the owners of 
Hobby Lobby Stores (“The Greens”) and Conestoga Wood Specialties (“The Hahns”), two 
“closely-held, for-profit” companies.71 Both the Greens and the Hahns run their companies 
according to “Christian” values, including their personal belief that life begins at conception and 
abortion is morally wrong.72 As a result, they objected to the all-inclusive contraceptive mandate 
                                                 
6(d) (1689), http://www.earlymoderntexts.com/assets/pdfs/locke1689b.pdf (“things that are forbidden by law 
because in their ordinary use they are harmful to the public ought not to be permitted to churches in their sacred 
rites.”). 
68 See 137 CONG. REC. E3083-02 (September 18, 1991) (Statement of Hon. Glenn M. Anderson of California) (In 
support of the passage of RFRA, the congressman still says that “law must weigh restrictions on our constitutional 
freedoms to protect societal order.”). 
69 134 S.Ct. 2751 (2014). 
70 Id. at 2770-74; c.f. Citizens United v. Federal Elections Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (giving corporations the 
first amendment right to free speech in the form of campaign contributions).  
71 Hobby Lobby, 134 S.Ct. at 2766. 
72 Id. at 2764-66. Conestoga’s board has adopted a “Vision and Values Statement” which affirms that Conestoga 
endeavors to “ensur[e] a reasonable profit in [a] manner that reflects [the Hahns’] Christian heritage” and a  
“Statement on the Sanctity of Human Life,” including the belief that it is “against [their] moral conviction to be 
involved in the termination of human life” after conception, which they believe is a “sin against God to which they 
are held accountable.” “Hobby Lobby’s statement of purpose commits the Greens to ‘[h]onoring the Lord in all 
[they] do by operating the company in a manner consistent with Biblical principles.’ Each family member has 
signed a pledge to run the businesses in accordance with the family’s religious beliefs and to use the family assets to 
support Christian ministries.” 
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because they did not want to provide four “abortifacient” drugs to their employees.73 The Greens 
and the Hahns, on behalf of their corporations, sued the Department of Health and Human 
Services (“HHS”), the agency responsible for enforcing the Affordable Care Act, claiming 
interference with their free exercise rights and a violation of RFRA.74   
 The Court gave extensive analysis to the arguments of HHS that a RFRA defense should 
not be extended to closely-held, for-profit corporations, but rejected each, holding that Hobby 
Lobby and Conestoga had sincerely held religious beliefs which were substantially burdened by 
the contraceptive mandate.75 The substantial burden came in the form of the fines or penalties the 
companies would have to pay if they failed to comply: amounts reaching the tens of millions of 
dollars.76 The Court assumed there is a compelling government interest in ensuring that women 
receive comprehensive health coverage, but it held that enforcing the mandate against Hobby 
Lobby, Conestoga, and similar corporations was not the least restrictive means of furthering that 
interest.77 The Court allowed the plaintiffs to opt out of the contraceptive mandate using the 
process already available to religious organizations.78 
 Perhaps the Court reached the conclusion it did because an exception to the contraceptive 
mandate already existed for religious institutions.79 Certainly the availability of the exemption, 
which allowed religious organizations with sincerely held religious objections to providing 
contraceptives to opt out and let the insurance company cover the cost of contraceptives for its 
employees,80 made it easy for the court to extend RFRA protection to for-profit corporations 
                                                 
73 Id. at 2765. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. at 2785. 
76 Id. at 2775-76. 
77 Id. at 2782 (the compelling interest was in preserving public health). 
78 Id. 
79 See 45 C.F.R. §147.131 (as amended on September 14, 2015 to include the types of corporations involved in 
Hobby Lobby).  
80 Hobby Lobby, 134 S.Ct. at 2782. 
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with similar beliefs. Recall O’Centro, where the Court also pointed to the existence of a 
previously-existing exception to reach the conclusion that the government had not used the least 
restrictive means of furthering its compelling interest.81 However, the Hobby Lobby holding 
could have immense impact on free exercise jurisprudence if closely-held, for-profit corporations 
start challenging other laws with a RFRA defense.82 Hobby Lobby was not the first case in which 
a company challenged the new Affordable Care Act’s contraceptive mandate, but its success 
opened the door for other claims.83  
F. Free Exercise and RFRA Claims Since Hobby Lobby 
 Since Hobby Lobby was decided, attempts have been made to expand the reach of its 
holding. In several circuits, plaintiffs have claimed that even the required reporting form for the 
exemption to the contraceptive mandate is too much of a burden, and the Supreme Court 
agreed.84 One court has considered, but rejected, applying the Hobby Lobby exception to 
organizations that object to the contraceptive mandate on moral, not religious grounds.85 An 
injunction against enforcement of another part of the Affordable Care Act, the interpretation of 
the meaning of “sex” for the purpose of providing gender-specific health services, was granted to 
religious plaintiffs who would likely succeed on their RFRA claims that providing gender 
                                                 
81 Gonzales v. O Centro Espirito Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 436-37 (2006). 
82 See Hobby Lobby, 134 S.Ct. at 2787 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“In the Court’s view, RFRA demands 
accommodation of a for-profit corporation’s religious beliefs no matter the impact that accommodation may have on 
third parties who do not share the corporation owners’ religious faith—in these cases, thousands of women 
employed by Hobby Lobby and Conestoga or dependents of persons those corporations employ. Persuaded that 
Congress enacted RFRA to serve a far less radical purpose, and mindful of the havoc the Court’s judgment can 
introduce, I dissent.”). 
83 See, e.g. Eden Foods, Inc. v. Sebelius, 733 F.3d 626, 627-28 (6th Cir. 2013); Hobby Lobby, 134 S.Ct. at 2802 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (suggesting the holding could be extended to excuse an employer from paying the 
minimum wage). 
84 See Wheaton College v. Burwell, 134 S.Ct. 2806, 2807 (2014) (Since government already had notice of 
Wheaton’s objection, court granted injunction which excused them from filling out the form). But see id. at 2814 
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting), wondering how, without an official notice form, the government is supposed to know 
when religious organizations are objecting to the mandate.    
85 Real Alternatives, Inc. v. Burwell, 150 F.Supp.3d 419 (M.D. Penn. 2015). 
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transition services substantially burdened their free exercise of religion.86 The Catholic Church 
of Milwaukee tried to use RFRA get out of complying with the bankruptcy code.87 There have 
been others.   
 A concern of the dissent in Hobby Lobby was that, after the majority’s holding, private 
employers would use a RFRA defense to all kinds of claims, including discrimination claims by 
employees.88 Though the majority expressly stated that “[t]he Government has a compelling 
interest in providing an equal opportunity to participate in the workforce,”89 there have been at 
least two claims in the district courts since Hobby Lobby which test the Court’s resolve not to 
allow a RFRA defense to Title VII.90  
 In the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, the court heard Mathis v. Christian Heating & Air 
Conditioning, Inc.91 The plaintiff, an atheist, worked for a closely-held, for-profit HVAC 
company whose owner wanted to run the company with Christian values.92 To that end, on the 
back of each employee’s ID badge was the company’s mission statement:  
This company is not only a business, it is a ministry. It is set on standards that are higher 
than man’s own. Our goal is to run this company in a way most pleasing to the Lord. 
 
Treating employees and customers as we would want to be treated along with running a 
business as if we are all part of one big family is our plan.93 
                                                 
86 Franciscan Alliance v. Burwell, 2016 WL 7638311, No. 7:16–cv–00108–O,*1 (N.D. Texas, December 31, 2016). 
87 See Listecki v. Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors, 780 F.3d. 731 (7th Cir. 2015), discussed infra, section 
I.D. 
88 134 S.Ct. at 2797 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
89 Id. at 2783 (mentioning the example of discrimination on the basis of race, though the same section of Title VII 
also prohibits discrimination on the basis of color, religion, gender, and national origin. See 42 USC § 2000e-2(a)).  
90 E.E.O.C. v. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., 201 F.Supp.3d 837 (E.D. Mich 2016), reversed and 
remanded, 884 F.3d 560, 567 (6th Cir. March 7, 2018); Mathis v. Christian Heating & Air Conditioning, Inc., 158 
F.Supp. 3d 317 (E.D. Penn. 2016). 
91 Id. 
92 Id. at 320.  
93 Id. at 321. 
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As an atheist, the plaintiff was uncomfortable with this mission statement, so he covered it with 
tape.94 When his boss found out, he was asked to remove the tape or leave the company.95 That 
was his last day of employment.96 Mathis filed charges of discrimination against the company, 
claiming that they had discriminated against him because of his religion, or lack thereof.97 The 
company owners made it clear that they would have preferred Mathis to act like, if not actually 
be, a Christian.98 The Company asserted a RFRA defense, claiming that forcing them to comply 
with Title VII’s anti-discrimination provision by attempting to reasonably accommodate 
Mathis’s atheism was a burden on the company’s free exercise rights.99 Using traditional Title 
VII analysis, the court found that a reasonable jury could find that covering up the mission on his 
badge with tape did not cause undue hardship to the employer and denied summary judgment to 
the company.100 Unfortunately, the Mathis court did not address the merits of the company’s 
RFRA defense because RFRA is not available as a defense in suits between private parties in the 
Third Circuit.101 It could also be argued that the court was not convinced that it made sense to 
excuse a company’s failure to accommodate an employee’s religious concerns by insisting that 
the company’s religious beliefs were more important. Engaging in this type of inquiry not only 
creates an unfair advantage for the employer, but could also violate the Establishment Clause.   
                                                 
94 Id. at 322.  
95 Id. at 323. 
96 Id. The company claimed that this was a resignation and denied his unemployment. He claims it was a 
termination. 
97 Id. at 324. 
98 Id. at 321-22. 
99 Id. at 320. Title VII requires employers to accommodate employees’ religious practices in the workplace unless it 
causes “undue hardship.” See Trans World Airlines, Inc., v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 75-76 (1977). In the context of 
religious accommodation, an undue hardship is usually considered anything more than a “de minimus” cost to the 
employer. Id. at 84. Further, an employer cannot take an adverse employment action based on an assumption that it 
cannot accommodate a religious practice, even if that assumption would be true. E.E.O.C. v. Abercrombie and Fitch 
Stores, Inc., 135 S.Ct. 2028, 2033 (2015).  
100 Id. at 333. 
101 Id. at 328. 
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 The Eastern District of Michigan was not afraid to engage in this kind of inquiry, 
however. In E.E.O.C. v. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., the court allowed a private 
employer to raise a RFRA defense to a sex discrimination claim, resulting in summary judgment 
for the employer.102 The complainant, a biological man, worked for the defendant as a funeral 
director.103 When he told his boss that he was transgender and would begin dressing as a woman, 
he was fired.104 The E.E.O.C. filed a lawsuit on his behalf, claiming that this was sex 
discrimination prohibited by Title VII.105   
 The defendant funeral home claimed a RFRA defense, even though it is “not affiliated 
with or part of any church and . . . do[es] not avow any religious purpose. Its employees are not 
required to hold any religious views.”106  However, it is a closely-held corporation, like the 
companies in Hobby Lobby, whose owner believes that believes that he “would be violating 
God’s commands if [he] were to permit one of the [Funeral Home’s] funeral directors to deny 
their sex while acting as a representative of [the Funeral Home].”107 Further, the owner testified 
that if he  
were forced to violate [his] sincerely held religious beliefs by paying for or otherwise 
permitting one of [his] employees to dress inconsistent with his or her biological sex, [he] 
would feel significant pressure to sell [the] business and give up [his] life’s calling of 
ministering to grieving people as a funeral home director and owner.108 
                                                 
102 201 F.Supp.3d 837, 870 (E.D. Mich 2016). 
103 Id. at 840.  
104 Id. at 845. 
105 Id. at 841. The E.E.O.C. followed a theory that this was impermissible sex-stereotyping, as prohibited by Price 
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1990). Though the court admits that the E.E.O.C. had uncovered rare “direct 
evidence” that Stephens was fired “because of” his sex, that was not enough to survive the RFRA defense. Id. at 
850, 854. 
106 Id. at 843. 




This was enough for the court to agree with the defendant that the funeral home had made out a 
prima facie case that its free exercise rights would be violated if it had to follow the law and 
allow the plaintiff to dress as a woman.109   
 The court then proceeded to analyze the next part of the RFRA test: whether the E.E.O.C. 
had shown a compelling interest and whether the restrictions on the funeral home were the least 
restrictive means of furthering that interest.110 Assuming that enforcement of Title VII was a 
compelling interest, the court found that the E.E.O.C. had not shown that insisting the funeral 
home allow Stephens to dress as a woman was the least restrictive means of furthering that 
interest.111 Instead, the court seemed to chastise the E.E.O.C. for pushing an alternative agenda: 
trying to “bootstrap” Title VII to include protections for gender identity.112 The outcome of this 
case is that a closely-held, for-profit employer was successfully able to assert a RFRA defense to 
a discrimination claim. As in Hobby Lobby, the court’s focus was on the government’s inability to 
show that it was imposing the least restrictive means of enforcing a law which interfered with the 
company’s free exercise. The E.E.O.C. has filed for an appeal to the Sixth Circuit, which will 
apply de novo review.113 On review, perhaps the court will distinguish this case from Hobby Lobby 
by considering more strongly the first prong of the RFRA test, the substantial burden, and find that 
the burden on the Funeral Home director’s religion, simply allowing an employee to dress like a 
woman, is not nearly as substantial as millions of dollars in fines. Further, following Justice 
                                                 
109 Id. at 855. 
110 Id. at 857 (“The Funeral Home Is Entitled To An Exemption Unless The E.E.O.C. Meets Its Demanding Two-
Part Burden. (emphasis added)). 
111 Id. at 860-63 (questioning why the E.E.O.C. did not try to suggest any alternatives, such as a gender neutral dress 
code).   
112 Id.; c.f. Hively v. Ivy Tech Community College, 830 F.3d 698, 706 (7th Cir. Ind. 2016) (“a gender stereotyping 
claim should not be used to bootstrap protection for sexual orientation into Title VII.”). But see Hively v. Ivy Tech 
Community College of Indiana, 853 F.3d 339 (7th Cir. 2017) (reh’g en banc) (holding that discrimination on the 
basis of sexual orientation is discrimination because of sex), the Sixth Circuit should take note of this holding in the 
appeal of the Funeral Home case.   
113 Bentkowski v. Scene Magazine, 637 F.3d 689, 693 (6th Cir. 2011). 
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Ginsberg’s reasoning in dissent, because the relationship between the funeral home owner and the 
employee was not a religious one, the funeral home owner’s religious beliefs are too attenuated 
from the discriminatory practices of the company to be a violation of RFRA.114 Unlike Hobby 
Lobby, the employer’s substantial burden claim was evaluated on a largely subjective, as opposed 
to financial, basis. Though the government’s compelling interest in this case was assumed, just 
like it was in Hobby Lobby, 115 there is not a substantial enough burden on the Funeral Home 
Director’s religion to allow a RFRA defense and erode the purpose of Title VII.116 
II. Employment Discrimination and the Free Exercise of Religion 
A. The Purpose of Title VII and the Anti-Discrimination Statutes is to Eradicate 
Workplace Discrimination, which is a Compelling Interest. 
 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was enacted with the purpose of eradicating 
workplace discrimination in the United States.117 Title VII protects employees from 
discrimination based on their race, color, national origin, sex, and religion.118 Title VII was 
enacted with the purpose of righting a major societal wrong. We live in a nation that values equal 
treatment, and these statutes are intended to ensure that minorities do not lose the means of 
providing for themselves and their families simply because they are different. To that end, many 
                                                 
114 See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S.Ct. 2751, 2799 (2014) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“I would 
conclude that the connection between the families’ religious objections and the contraceptive coverage requirement 
is too attenuated to rank as substantial.”). 
115 Id. at 2780; 201 F.Supp.3d 837, 841 (E.D. Mich. 2016). 
116 See E.E.O.C. v. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., 884 F.3d 560, 567 (March 7, 2018). The Sixth Circuit 
agreed with this assessment, holding that, “the Funeral Home has not established that applying Title VII's 
proscriptions against sex discrimination to the Funeral Home would substantially burden Rost's religious exercise, 
and therefore the Funeral Home is not entitled to a defense under RFRA; [and] even if Rost's religious exercise were 
substantially burdened, the EEOC has established that enforcing Title VII is the least restrictive means of furthering 
the government's compelling interest in eradicating workplace discrimination against Stephens.”   
117 See Rogers v. E.E.O.C., 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971) (“Title VII . . . should be accorded a liberal 
interpretation in order to effectuate the purpose of Congress to eliminate . . . discrimination.”). 
118 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). 
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courts have held that the government’s interest in enforcing anti-discrimination statutes is always 
a compelling one.119 
 On the other hand, we live in a nation where the default is at-will employment. Ever since 
the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Lochner v. New York,120 the freedom to enter into 
employment contracts at-will has been an American staple. Anti-discrimination statutes interfere 
with an employer’s ability to terminate an employee at-will; under the circumstances described 
in such statutes, an employer must not interfere with the terms and conditions of their 
employees’ employment just because of an immutable characteristic or deeply held belief. 
Hobby Lobby further suggests an expansion to the class of employers that can claim religious 
exceptions to the anti-discrimination statutes. The dissent warned of the perils of this expansion:  
The Court’s determination that RFRA extends to for-profit corporations is bound to have 
untoward effects. . . . [I]ts logic extends to corporations of any size, public or private. Little 
doubt that RFRA claims will proliferate, for the Court’s expansive notion of corporate 
personhood . . . invites for-profit entities to seek religion-based exemptions from 
regulations they deem offensive to their faith.121  
As shown in E.E.O.C. v. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc.,122 this could have tremendous 
implications for employee protections from discrimination in the future. 
B. Protections for Religion for Both Employers and Employees 
 Under Title VII, employees are protected from discrimination on the basis of religion. 
This is of course in addition to their First Amendment right to be free from governmental 
                                                 
119 See State by McClure v. Sports & Health Club, Inc., 370 N.W.2d 844, 852 (Minn. 1985) (“Invidious private 
discrimination . . . has never been accorded affirmative constitutional protections.”); E.E.O.C. v. R.G. & G.R. Harris 
Funeral Homes, Inc., 201 F.Supp.3d 837 (E.D. Mich 2016); Redhead v. Conf. of Seventh Day Adventists, 440 
F.Supp.2d 211, 220 (E.D.N.Y. 2006); Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S.Ct. 2751, 2783 (2014) (The 
government has a compelling interest in providing equal opportunity in the workforce).  
120 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (holding that a state labor law which limited hours in a workweek violated an employer’s due 
process rights, and supporting the premise that both employers and employees have a fundamental right to the 
freedom to contract for employment).  
121 Hobby Lobby, 134 S.Ct. at 2797 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
122 201 F.Supp.3d 837, reversed and remanded, 884 F.3d 560, 567 (6th Cir. March 7, 2018). 
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burdens on their free exercise of religion. An employer is prohibited from making employment 
decisions based on an employee or applicant’s religion or lack thereof.123 Further, an employer is 
required to reasonably accommodate an employee’s religion in the workplace, as long as it does 
not cause undue hardship to the employer.124 Since claims under the First Amendment are 
constitutional claims and RFRA is a statutory claim against the government, RFRA likely does 
not protect an employee against his private employer, even in a discrimination suit.125 However, 
Employers may assert a RFRA defense to discrimination claims in certain circumstances. 
 Religious employers are statutorily protected from interference with their religion. 
Qualifying organizations such as churches, religious schools, organizations run by not-for-profit 
religious orders, and others whose business purpose is religious in nature have a right, by 
statutory exception,126 to prefer employees who share the organization’s beliefs. In addition, the 
courts have also recognized a common-law “ministerial exception.”127 The ministerial exception 
essentially protects religious organizations from “excessive government entanglement with 
religion.”128 If an organization raises a successful ministerial exception argument, it will act as a 
complete defense to a discrimination claim. The reasoning is simple: in the absence of direct 
evidence of discrimination (which rarely exists), proving discrimination requires a plaintiff to 
show that his or her employer’s reason for the challenged employment action is pretextual.129 A 
                                                 
123 See E.E.O.C. v. Abercrombie and Fitch Stores, Inc., 135 S.Ct. 2028 (2015) (holding that even the assumption on 
the part of an employer that an applicant’s religious beliefs will cause her to engage in conduct the employer is 
unwilling to accommodate is sufficient to find a violation of Title VII).  
124 See Trans World Airlines, Inc., v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977). 
125 See, e.g. Harrell v. Donahue, 638 F.3d 975, 983 (8th Cir. 2011) (Title VII provides the remedy for claims of 
religious discrimination and the drafters of RFRA did not intend to affect religious accommodation under title VII). 
126 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a); see LeBoon v. Lancaster Jewish Community Center Ass’n., 503 F.3d 217, 226 (3d Cir. 
2007) (stating factors used to determine whether an organization qualifies for the religious exemption in Section 702 
of Title VII).   
127 See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. E.E.O.C., 565 U.S. 171, 188 (2012) (recognizing 
a ministerial exception at the national level).  
128 Rweyemanu v. Cote, 520 F.3d 198, 208-09 (2d Dist. 2008). 
129 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 807 (1973). 
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court cannot consider the “pretext” that a church’s “minister” did not properly observe or 
promote his or her religion, without implicating the Establishment Clause.130 Therefore, if a 
person bringing an employment discrimination claim against his religious employer is 
considered to be a “minister” of that religious organization, someone responsible for relaying the 
religious message to others, the court will not apply anti-discrimination laws to the employment 
of the minister.131  The Supreme Court first discussed the ministerial exception is Hosanna-
Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. E.E.O.C..132 A teacher at the defendant’s 
school brought discrimination claims when she was fired after a disability leave.133 The 
defendant claimed that the plaintiff could not bring claims under the ADA because the teacher 
was a “minister” of their faith.134 The Court discussed extensively the history and purpose of the 
Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses, reiterating that the Constitution prevents the 
government from interfering in a religion’s selection of “ecclesiastical individuals.”135 To that 
end, the Court recognized a “ministerial exception” to discrimination claims against a religious 
organization.136 Next, the court engaged in an extensive discussion of the plaintiff’s job duties, 
training, expectations, and other related facts to determine that the plaintiff was, in fact, a 
minister and the defendant was entitled to the complete defense offered by the ministerial 
exception.137 What the Court in Hosanna-Tabor made clear is that whether or not the ministerial 
exception applies as a defense to a religious discrimination claim by an employee is a fact-
                                                 
130 See Rweyemanu, 520 F.3d at 208-09. 
131 The exception is not limited in application to ordained ministers, but rather is a fact-intensive inquiry which can 
encompass any employee whose position is “important to the spiritual and pastoral mission” of a religious 
organization. E.E.O.C. v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Raleigh, N.C., 213 F.3d 795, 801 (4th Cir. 2000). 
132 565 U.S. 171 (2012). 
133 Id. at 179. 
134 Id.  
135 Id. at 182-85. 
136 Id. at 188. 
137 Id. 191-94. 
23 
 
specific inquiry which must be carefully considered in each case, so that the court does not 
impermissibly entangle itself in the affairs of the church.138  
 The ministerial exception is not available if the employee is not a “minister.” This is 
similar to a RFRA defense, which can only be invoked where there is a “substantial burden” to 
free exercise. An employer who believes that a law substantially burdens its free exercise of 
religion may argue either that it is entitled to the ministerial exception or that it has a defense 
under RFRA. Both protect a religious employer’s right to statutory exceptions to laws of general 
applicability. The analysis should be the same: if the employer/employee relationship is not 
established as a religious one, neither the ministerial exception nor RFRA should be available to 
the employer as a defense. For example, in E.E.O.C. v. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., 
the funeral home owner claimed that his sincerely held religious beliefs would be burdened by a 
male employee dressing as a female at work.139 However, he did say that his religious beliefs 
would not be offended by Stephens dressing as a woman outside of work.140 This comment 
should have undermined the sincerity of his religious beliefs and stopped the inquiry into the 
RFRA defense.141 Regardless, whether sincerely or not, employers have attempted to invoke 
both of these defenses many times since RFRA’s passage.   
C. RFRA As a Possible Defense to Employment Discrimination Claims 
                                                 
138 Id. at 190 (no bright line rule for when the ministerial exception applies), 191-93 (considering the facts as applied 
to the plaintiff); See also E.E.O.C. v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Raleigh, N.C., 213 F.3d 795, 801 (4th Cir. 2000) 
(“the ministerial exception promotes the most cherished principles of religious liberty, [but] its contours are not 
unlimited and its application in a given case requires a fact-specific inquiry.”). 
139 201 F.Supp.3d 837 (E.D. Mich 2016). 
140 Id. at 848. 
141 See E.E.O.C. v. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., 884 F.3d 560, 567 (6th Cir. March 7, 2018), reversing 
the circuit court and holding that the Funeral Home was not entitled to a RFRA defense, and even if it were, the 
government established that enforcing Title VII is the least restrictive means of enforcing the compelling interest of 
eradicating workplace discrimination.  
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 Since RFRA was enacted, there have been several attempts by employers to invoke its 
protections after being sued for employment discrimination. One of the first, and probably the 
one to take such a defense the most seriously, was Hankins v. Lyght.142 Recall that in Hankins, 
the Second Circuit imposed a RFRA defense on the employer of a minister who had filed for age 
discrimination, saying that RFRA should be the extent of the religious inquiry in free exercise 
claims.143 This holding also displaced the common law ministerial exception, at least 
temporarily, in the Second Circuit. On remand, the court said that the ministerial exception was 
not necessarily replaced by RFRA; instead, since it would be impermissible under the First 
Amendment for the court to interfere with the church’s process for choosing its ministers, a 
finding that the challenged action was subject to the ministerial exception was prima facie 
evidence of a substantial burden.144 Therefore, in circumstances where a the employment of a 
“minister” at a religious institution is at stake in the Second Circuit, the employer meets the first 
prong of the RFRA defense, the substantial burden, if the employee qualifies as a minister under 
the common law ministerial exception.145  
 This holding was based largely on the district court’s decision in Redhead v. Conference 
of Seventh-Day Adventists.146 The defendant employer in Redhead was a religiously-run 
elementary school.147 When the plaintiff employee, an unmarried female, became pregnant, the 
defendant fired her because her pregnancy was evidence of “fornication,” conduct prohibited by 
                                                 
142 441 F.3d 96 (2d Cir. 2006) (discussed infra, section I.D.). 
143 Id. at 102 (“the RFRA must be deemed the full expression of Congress’ intent with regard to the religion-related 
issues before us and displace earlier judge-made doctrines [the ministerial exception] that might have been used to 
amelieorate the ADEA’s impact on religious organizations and activities.”). 
144 Id. at 236.   
145 See Infra, Part III.D., suggesting that this type of analysis should be applied in all cases where an employer 
wishes to use RFRA as a defense to an employment discrimination claim. 
146 440 F.Supp. 2d 211 (E.D.N.Y. 2006). 
147 Id. at 214. 
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the employer’s religion.148 She filed claims of sex discrimination under Title VII, and the 
defendant asserted RFRA as its defense.149 The court did not want to consider RFRA given that 
this was a suit between two private parties, but was bound by the circuit precedent in Hankins to 
do so.150 Interestingly, the court re-examined the relationship between RFRA and the ministerial 
exception, holding that the two were not mutually exclusive.151 Instead, applying the ministerial 
exception, it found that because the plaintiff was not a “minister,” there was no substantial 
burden to the school’s free exercise and therefore RFRA was not implicated.152 Further, the court 
surmised that  
the ministerial exception guards against excessive entanglement and is a tool for analyzing 
the nature of the alleged burden on religious exercise. It is . . . relevant to whether a 
religious organization’s hiring decisions regarding a particular individual should be 
insulated based on First Amendment concerns. . . . For the RFRA analysis in particular, the 
ministerial exception is necessary for a case-specific application of the compelling interest 
test.”153 
 Most likely, if this case had been decided one year later after Hobby Lobby, the outcome 
would be different. It seems apparent after Hobby Lobby that if religious non-profits and closely 
held for-profit corporations with religious owners can claim a RFRA defense to a neutral law, so 
can non-profit hospitals run by religious organizations. In the Second Circuit, under the right 
circumstances, a “religious employer,” regardless of not-for-profit status, could raise a RFRA 
defense to a Title VII claim of discrimination.154 Those circumstances are limited but were 
definitely expanded after Hobby Lobby, as is evidenced by E.E.O.C. v. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral 
                                                 
148 Id. at 224. 
149 Id. at 214. 
150 Id. at 219. 
151 Id. at 220.   
152 Id. at 221. 
153 Id. at 220 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
154 See Penn v. N.Y. Methodist Hosp., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 142109 at *27-28 (S.D.N.Y. Sep. 30, 2013) (“It is 
implicit from Rweyemamu that the second circuit would have held that the RFRA amended Title VII . . .”) but see 
Francis v. Ridge, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40015, *5-8 (D. Virg. Isl. December 27, 2005) (based on the legislative 
history of both statutes, Title VII preempts the RFRA). 
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Homes, Inc.155 However, the existence of an almost automatic compelling interest in eradicating 
workplace discrimination should (1) severely limit the circumstances under which a RFRA defense 
can be brought and (2) require courts to use a ministerial exception type analysis when evaluating 
whether the religious burden on an employer is “substantial.” Such an in-depth, case-by-case 
analysis is sensitive to First Amendment concerns and will prevent abuse of the RFRA defense. 
III. Closely-held, For-profit Corporations Should Not Be Able to Use RFRA as a Defense to 
Employment Discrimination Claims. 
 Hobby Lobby expanded the types of organizations that can claim a RFRA defense. Prior 
to Hobby Lobby, in order to claim that any law interfered with a party’s free exercise of religion, 
that party had to have a “religion.” Logically, then, the claim was available to individuals and to 
religious organizations. After Hobby Lobby, “religion” can be attributed to closely-held, for-
profit, private corporations when the company’s owners have sincerely held religious beliefs. It 
is possible, based on precedent, that these types of corporations could use RFRA as a defense 
when faced with employment discrimination claims, if they can show that the government’s 
enforcement of those anti-discrimination statutes against them substantially burdens a sincerely 
held religious belief. Of course, under the language of RFRA, if a company makes such an 
assertion, the government must have a chance to show that enforcing the law is the least 
restrictive means of furthering a compelling government interest. The government has a strong 
compelling interest in preventing discrimination in the workplace, which should not be displaced 
with laws like RFRA. The courts should not allow closely-held, for-profit corporations to assert 
RFRA as a defense to a claim of employment discrimination because it will undermine the 
purpose of Title VII.156 If, however, the Court allows such a defense, it should be used only 
                                                 
155 See 201 F.Supp.3d 837 (E.D. Mich. 2016), reversed and remanded, 884 F.3d 560, 567 (6th Cir. March 7, 2018), 
discussed infra, section I.F.  
156 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S.Ct. 2751, 2783 (2014) (“The principal dissent raises the possibility 
that discrimination in hiring, for example on the basis of race, might be cloaked as religious practice to escape legal 
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where (1) the government is a party and (2) a standard is established for evaluating whether there 
is a substantial burden on the company’s free exercise of religion. Applying a ministerial 
exception-type analysis to evaluate the employer-employee relationship would be an appropriate 
“substantial burden” standard that aligns with prior precedent.157 Only in those narrow 
circumstances should the Court apply the RFRA compelling interest test.  
A. Most Employment Discrimination Lawsuits are Between Two Private Parties. If the 
Government is Not a Party, It Would Be Too Burdensome To Assert The 
Compelling Interest in Every Claim 
 When an employee feels he or she has been discriminated against by an employer, he 
must file a charge with the E.E.O.C. or with the equivalent state organization.158 The E.E.O.C. 
may decide, based on the charge, to enforce the anti-discrimination statutes against that employer 
itself, but most often it issues a Notice of Right to Sue, allowing private parties to file their own 
claims.159 It is easy to see how the government’s purpose in enacting anti-discrimination statutes, 
to try to eradicate workplace discrimination, is, without further inquiry, a compelling interest. 
However, the least restrictive means test is a fact intensive inquiry. Applying RFRA to 
employment discrimination claims would create a huge burden on the government to intervene in 
order to satisfy this inquiry. The E.E.O.C. already has an incredible backlog of cases; requiring it 
to assert defenses to RFRA claims between private parties would stretch its resources even 
further, undermining its mission.   
                                                 
sanction. . . . Our decision today provides no such shield. The Government has a compelling interest in providing an 
equal opportunity to participate in the workforce without regard to race, and prohibitions on racial discrimination are 
precisely tailored to achieve that critical goal.”). 
157 E.E.O.C. v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Raleigh, N.C., 213 F.3d 795, 801 (4th Cir. 2000) (“the [ministerial] 
exception shelters certain employment decisions from the scrutiny of civil authorities so as to preserve the 
independence of religious institutions in performing their spiritual functions.”); Redhead v. Conference of Seventh-
Day Adventists, 440 F.Supp. 2d 211, 220 (E.D.N.Y. 2006). (“For the RFRA analysis in particular, the ministerial 
exception is necessary for a case-specific application of the compelling interest test.”).  





 Assuming RFRA is available as a defense in suits between private parties, a typical claim 
might be as follows: a single, unmarried female employee of a Christian book store decides that 
she is ready to have children and begins to receive fertility treatments. The owner of the store has 
a sincerely held religious belief that it is a sin to have children out of wedlock. He believes that 
allowing her to take time off to go for fertility treatments substantially burdens this religious 
belief, since he has to pay other employees to cover for her.160 Believing he has no alternative, he 
fires her. She brings a claim under Title VII, alleging that the termination was because of her sex. 
She can likely make out a prima facie case of sex discrimination: Under the McDonnell-Douglas 
framework, she can show that (1) she was a member of a protected class (female); (2) she was 
qualified for her position (she was working there); (3) she suffered an adverse employment 
action (she was fired); and (4) similarly situated employees who were not female were treated 
differently (men who wanted to take time off for medical treatments were probably not fired).161 
The book store, acting through its owner, would then assert an affirmative defense under RFRA. 
He could show that application of Title VII to him in this situation (requiring him to retain this 
employee) (1) substantially burdened (2) his sincerely held (3) religious belief.162 Assuming he 
was successful, the court would then apply the Compelling Interest test. This is something the 
government, not the plaintiff, has to prove; the E.E.O.C. would have to intervene to make an 
argument that applying Title VII to this employer is not only a compelling interest, but that under 
the specific facts of the case, it is the least restrictive means of accomplishing that interest. This 
is absolutely unworkable. The current system for processing charges of discrimination already 
takes 2-3 years from filing to verdict; if the E.E.O.C. had to intervene every time an employer 
                                                 
160 Part of the substantial burden analysis includes the cost to the employer of complying with the law. See Hobby 
Lobby, 134 S.Ct. at 2775-76. 
161 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S.792, 802 (1973). 
162 See Gonzales v. O Centro Espirito Beneficiente Uniao de Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 428 (2006). 
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asserted a RFRA defense it would take much longer. A RFRA defense would not be asserted in 
every discrimination claim, but any case which is not litigated by the E.E.O.C. in which the 
employer did assert a RFRA defense would then need to be addressed with E.E.O.C. resources. 
This would affect the E.E.O.C.’s ability to process all charges. The impact to the general public 
is just too great to allow such a process to occur. RFRA should not be available as a defense to 
discrimination claims, especially when suits are brought by private parties. 
B. Penalties to Private Employers of Not Complying with Title VII are Mostly 
Equitable in Nature, Therefore They Do Not Create a Substantial Burden 
 If such a defense is allowed, a closely-held, for-profit employer must prove the first 
prong of the RFRA defense: application of a general law causes a substantial burden on the 
employer’s free exercise of religion. In Hobby Lobby, this burden came in the form of substantial 
monetary penalties for failing to comply with the law that created the burden.163 However, in 
employment discrimination claims, the traditional remedies for plaintiffs are equitable in 
nature.164 This usually includes things like backpay, expenses, and reinstatement or front pay. 
Plaintiffs can receive compensatory and punitive damages for their discrimination claims, but 
there are significant caps on the amounts. For example, an employee of the largest class of 
employer would only get up to $300,000 for such damages in a Title VII claim.165 In the above 
example, if it was found that the bookstore owner had in fact acted unlawfully in terminating the 
pregnant employee, he would likely only be responsible for her back wages, some front pay, and 
if the conduct was willful, a few thousand dollars in further damages. This is far from the 
millions at stake in Hobby Lobby.   
                                                 
163 Hobby Lobby, 134 S.Ct. at 2775-76. 





 The available remedies make it clear that complying with Title VII does not create a 
substantial financial burden on an employer. Unlike the potential penalties imposed under the 
ACA, paying one employee’s backpay and even up to an additional $300,000 in compensatory 
damages could not amount to any significant damage for a multi-million dollar company like 
Hobby Lobby. If an anti-discrimination statute truly burdens a company’s free exercise of 
religion, the financial burden of non-compliance will not be enough on its own to create a 
substantial burden on religion. Instead, courts should apply a ministerial exception type analysis 
to determine if forcing the relationship between the employer and the employee to continue 
would cause the substantial burden on the company’s free exercise of religion, without further 
trammeling the rights of the employee. 
C. In Religious Discrimination Cases, Allowing a RFRA Defense Would Require 
Courts to Engage in Unconstitutional Balancing of the Rights of Employees Against 
the Rights of Employers. 
 When an employee claims that his or her employer has engaged in unlawful 
discrimination under Title VII because of religion, that claim will require the employee to prove 
that the employer failed to accommodate his religious practices or that the terms and conditions 
of employment substantially burden the employee’s free exercise of religion.166 Allowing an 
employer to assert a RFRA defense under those circumstances would pit the employer’s free 
exercise rights against the free exercise rights of the employee. A court cannot engage in 
choosing whose religion is more important by determining if RFRA trumps Title VII – that 
would surely implicate the Establishment Clause. 
                                                 
166 See E.E.O.C. v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 135 S.Ct. 2028, 2036 (2015) (explaining that the plaintiff has 
the burden to show that the challenged action was taken because of her religion, though the employer has the burden 
of proving otherwise). 
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 Practically, a RFRA defense to a Title VII claim, on its face, means that the employee 
suffered an adverse employment action because of (a failure to participate in the employer’s) 
religion. If the employee’s conduct, or a law which protects such conduct, substantially burdens 
the employers’ religion, it stands to reason that such conduct does not substantially burden the 
employee’s religion. Therefore, if an employer takes action against the employee for that 
conduct, it would be because the employee’s religion was not the same as the employer’s. Title 
VII makes it unlawful to take an adverse action against an employee because of his religion. 
RFRA should not be available as a defense because, if successful, it would value the employer’s 
religion over the employee’s.  
 Further, consider a situation where the conduct is the result of the employee’s religious 
beliefs or lack thereof, such as the employee in Mathis who covered up the religious message on 
his ID badge because he was an atheist.167 Here, a RFRA defense would essentially force a court 
to choose between the employee’s right to be free from religious discrimination in the workplace 
and the employer’s right to be free from burdens on his free exercise by laws which force him to 
retain this employee. Choosing between one religion and another is a direct violation of the 
Establishment Clause. RFRA should clearly not be available as a defense in religious 
discrimination claims.  
IV. Conclusion: A Ministerial Exception Like Analysis Should Be Used to Determine 
Whether a Closely-Held, For-Profit Company Can Meet the Substantial Burden Prong of 
the RFRA Compelling Interest Test. 
 Since Congress articulated the need to address rampant workplace discrimination through 
the passage of Title VII in 1964, employers have raised all kinds of creative defenses. 
Interference with the employer’s First Amendment free exercise rights is just one of them. This 
                                                 
167 Mathis v. Christian Heating and Air Conditioning, Inc., 158 F.Supp.3d 317, 320 (E.D. Penn. 2016). 
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is understandable; the freedom to contract and the concept of employment-at-will are two 
strongly rooted practices and beliefs for most business owners and employers. The preservation 
of the right to free exercise of religion, without substantial burden by the government, is also 
something extremely important to everyone in the United States. Under RFRA, no law, even a 
neutral law of general applicability, can substantially burden a person’s free exercise of religion 
without showing that the law is the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling interest. 
There should be very narrow circumstances under which the free exercise right outweighs the 
right to be free from discrimination in the workplace. These would be the only possible 
circumstances under which a closely-held, for-profit corporation could raise a RFRA defense to 
an employment discrimination claim.   
 These narrow circumstances occur when two conditions are present. First, the 
government would have to be a party; in other words, the claim would need to be brought by the 
E.E.O.C. Second, the court would need to engage in a standard inquiry regarding whether or not 
the defendant sustains a substantial burden on its free exercise. This standard inquiry would be 
similar to the inquiry made when an organization wants to invoke the common law ministerial 
exception. In cases of a RFRA defense, it would be necessary to examine the nature of the 
relationship between employer and employee. If the relationship is one where it is the 
employee’s responsibility to further a religious mission of the company, then a fact-intensive 
analysis, similar to that applied for the ministerial exception, should be applied to determine if, 
as a threshold matter, not discriminating against the employee is a substantial burden on the 
company. If, however, the relationship is not “ministerial,” that is, it does not further a religious 
mission, then RFRA should not be allowed, whether the company qualifies as one that can claim 
the RFRA defense under Hobby Lobby or otherwise. This type of inquiry would not run afoul of 
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the establishment clause, because it is not a question of whether the practice of not 
discriminating against an employee involves a burden on a practice central to the employer’s 
religion, but whether the nature of the relationship could burden religion in a substantial way.168 
It should be emphasized that not-for-profit religious organizations use labor to promote religion, 
while closely-held for profit companies use labor to make money.169 This distinction should not 
be ignored when considering whether a company has a valid RFRA defense. Instead, the inquiry 
should focus on the “function of the position at issue.”170 
 A hypothetical example can illustrate this theory. Suppose two female employees of 
Hobby Lobby are fired, both for dressing too provocatively. One employee is a cashier, and the 
other is the Vice President of Marketing. They both go to the E.E.O.C., which agrees to litigate 
the cases together, as an example of blatant discrimination because of sex. In response to the 
lawsuit, Hobby Lobby asserts a RFRA defense, arguing that allowing women to dress in a 
provocative manner in the workplace is a substantial burden on the company’s sincerely held 
religious belief that women must dress modestly. They claim that the women’s style of dress 
reflected poorly on the company’s Christian image and alienated its customers, causing a loss of 
business, interference with their branding and marketing strategy, and confusion in the 
marketplace. In order to determine if forcing Hobby Lobby to allow these women to wear their 
clothing of choice is in fact a substantial burden, the court should engage in a fact specific 
inquiry to determine whether the dress of these employees actually has an impact on the 
                                                 
168 See 137 CONG. REC. E3083-02 (September 18, 1991) (Statement of Hon. Glenn M. Anderson of California) 
(explaining that the court must not engage in inquiries into the “centrality” of a particular religious practice but that 
there must be some acceptable inquiry that allows for an analysis of how a neutral law interferes with free exercise. 
Quoting Justice O’Connor in dissent of the Smith decision, he says, “The distinction between questions of centrality 
and questions of sincerity and burden is admittedly fine, . . . and one that courts are capable of making.”).  
169 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S.Ct. 2751, 2797 (2014) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (explaining why the 
majority was wrong to extend the holding to for-profit corporations).  
170 E.E.O.C. v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Raleigh, N.C., 213 F.3d 795, 801 (4th Cir. 2000). 
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company’s religion. The court should consider similar facts to those it would consider when 
determining whether the ministerial exception applies. In this hypothetical example, it is 
conceivable that the Vice President of Marketing for Hobby Lobby would be the person in 
charge of promoting the company’s “Christian” image and mission. Dressing in a manner 
directly in conflict with that image in mission is plausibly a burden on the company’s religion. 
However, the cashier’s duties are arguably too attenuated from the mission of the company for 
her clothing to have any meaningful impact on the company’s religious mission. She may 
interact with customers, but only in one store and only sometimes. Even if her style of dress 
suggests a clearly “un-christian” set of values, that single employee’s actions cannot be imputed 
to the company as a whole. Though it may still not be enough to overcome the compelling 
interest in preserving a workplace free from discrimination, Hobby Lobby should only be able to 
assert the RFRA defense as to the Vice President of Marketing’s discrimination claim, not the 
cashier’s discrimination claim.  
 Importantly, if courts apply this analysis and do not find a substantial burden, that would 
act to bar the RFRA defense. If the courts do find a substantial burden, then the result would 
differ from the ministerial exception in one important way. Once a court finds that an employee 
is a “minister,” that acts as a complete defense to a discrimination claim. Once a court finds that 
an employee’s discrimination claim is a “substantial burden” on a closely-held, for profit 
corporation’s sincerely held religious beliefs, then the court must proceed to the rest of the 
compelling interest test to determine if RFRA acts to bar the discrimination claim. RFRA itself is 
clear that if a neutral law of general applicability substantially burdens free exercise of religion, 
the government must justify the application of that law as the least restrictive means of furthering 
a compelling interest. The test suggested in this paper does not over-ride that requirement, it only 
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limits the circumstances under which it will be applied. This is extremely important to prevent 
abuse of the RFRA defense. Without such a threshold barrier, there is nothing to stop companies 
from asserting that a law substantially burdens their free exercise of religion, thereby forcing the 
government to unnecessarily assert compelling interests underlying many laws, perhaps resulting 
in the anarchy foreseen by Justice Scalia.171 
 This solution would prevent the government from excessively interfering with a 
company’s sincere religious beliefs while protecting our nation’s extremely important anti-
discrimination statutes. Allowing RFRA as a defense without a threshold inquiry into the validity 
of its application under the circumstances has the potential to significantly erode employees’ 
rights to be free from discrimination in the workplace. Substantial progress has been made since 
1964, but we have a long way to go before workplace discrimination is eradicated.   
 The ministerial exception does not apply to excuse churches from anti-discrimination 
laws as applied to non-ministerial employees; applying a RFRA defense should be similarly 
limited. “Where no spiritual function is involved, the First Amendment does not stay the 
application of a generally applicable law such as Title VII to the religious employer unless 
Congress so provides.”172 Congress has provided for an exception through RFRA, but it should 
be narrowly applied. Though it appears that through its holding in Hobby Lobby, the Supreme 
Court has opened the door for closely-held, for-profit corporations to use RFRA as a defense to 
claims of employment discrimination by the E.E.O.C., courts should heed the dissent’s warning 
and limit these defenses by using a ministerial exception like analysis to address the substantial 
burden question. This threshold inquiry will limit the RFRA defense to the instances in which 
there really is a potential for unconstitutional burdens on the free exercise of religion, and 
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prevent companies from abusing RFRA to undermine the purpose of the anti-discrimination 
statutes.   
